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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43706 
      ) 
v.      ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-3098 
      ) 
DANIEL JOSEPH SMITH,   ) APPELLANT'S 
      ) REPLY BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
 ) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Daniel Smith appeals, contending the district court erred by denying his motion 
for appointment of counsel on his motion for leniency under I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 
35), and also by denying that motion on its merits.  The State’s response articulates and 
argues under the improper standard for determining whether the information presented 
with that motion is new and additional, as it relies on the standard for Rule 35 motions 
challenging a stipulated sentence.  Since Mr. Smith did not agree to a stipulated 
sentence as part of his plea agreement, the standard articulated by the State is 
inapplicable, as the Court of Appeals has expressly refused to apply that standard 
beyond that narrow context.  Under the appropriate standard of review, which considers 
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whether the district court had been previously presented with the information in 
question, Mr. Smith presented new and additional information with his motion.  As such, 
it was not frivolous.  Therefore, the district court erred in denying his motion for 
appointment of counsel on that motion and by denying that motion on its merits. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Smith’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
 
ISSUE 









A. When Applying The Proper Standard For New Or Additional Information, 
Mr. Smith’s Motion Is Not Frivolous, And So, He Should Have Been Appointed 
Counsel 
 
As an initial matter, the State characterizes Mr. Smith’s information in support of 
his Rule 35 motion as only reiterating the points he made at the sentencing hearing.  
(Resp. Br., p.3.)  That argument is contradicted by the record, which shows that the 
information – most notably, the information that, once Mr. Smith was informed of his HIV 
diagnosis, he had taken efforts to reduce his risk of spreading that disease – was not 
presented at sentencing.  (Compare R., p.142 (Mr. Smith’s assertion of this information 
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in his Rule 35 motion), with Tr., p.12, L.5 - p.15, L.19 (the defense’s comments at the 
sentencing hearing, not mentioning Mr. Smith’s diagnosis at all).)  Had that information 
been presented, the district court could not have justifiably reached the conclusion it did, 
that Mr. Smith had knowingly exposed people to that condition in the year before he 
learned of his condition.  (See Tr., p.18, Ls.13-19 (the district court stating, “I found 
myself wondering . . . how many others were affected by this reckless behavior”).)  
Therefore, Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 motion was accompanied by information that had not 
previously been presented to the district court.  In fact, the State appears to 
subsequently concede that point as its entire argument in regard to Mr. Smith’s motion 
for appointment of counsel is based on the premise that the information was not “new” 
because Mr. Smith was aware of it at the time of the sentencing hearing (implying that 
he should have presented it at that hearing).  (See Resp. Br., pp.3-4.)   
Given the State’s apparent concession, the only question on appeal is whether 
the information accompanying the Rule 35 motion, which to that point, had not been 
presented to the district court, constituted “new or additional” information in support of 
the motion.  The State asserts the standard to evaluate that question is that the new or 
additional information has to be information “that was not available at the time of 
sentencing.”  (Resp. Br., pp.3-4 (emphasis omitted).)  It cites State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 
522, 526 (Ct. App. 1994), as the source for that standard.  (Resp. Br., p.3.)  However, 
that misrepresents the narrow scope of the Wade standard.  Wade applies only to the 
limited scenario where a Rule 35 motion is requesting leniency from a stipulated 
sentence.  State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 299 (Ct. App. 2007). 
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In Person, the Court of Appeals made it clear that the Wade standard was a 
product of the contractual concerns surrounding plea agreements for stipulated 
sentences: 
It is not only the prosecutor who is bound by a plea agreement-a 
defendant is also obligated to adhere to its terms, and the state is entitled 
to receive the benefit of its bargain.  Therefore, in State v. Wade, . . . we 
further stated that the defendant’s Rule 35 motion could have merit only if 
it were justified by new or additional information that was not available 
when the plea bargain was made. 
 
Person, 145 Idaho at 299 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).  In the traditional 
Rule 35 scenario, where the defendant is requesting leniency from a sentence to which 
he did not stipulate, the evaluation of “new or additional” information is focused on 
whether the district court judge was aware of the information attached to the Rule 35 
motion.  See, e.g., State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding a 
change in judicial personnel does not prevent the defendant from presenting information 
in support of his Rule 35 motion which was not available to the sentencing judge); see 
also State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) (discussing the standard for “new or 
additional” information in terms of information “provided to the district court”).   
Thus, it is specifically because of the contractual concerns in the stipulated-
sentence scenario that the focus understandably shifts to whether the defendant was 
aware of that information at the time of the plea agreement.  Person, 145 Idaho at 299; 
see also State v. Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482, 485 (Ct. App. 1997).  In that scenario, the 
district court is simply ratifying the sentence the parties agreed to.  Accordingly, the 
focus of the Rule 35 evaluation in that context is on the information the defendant had 
because any information the defendant had must have been taken into account in his 
decision to enter that agreement.  As a result, to show that sentence is excessive, he 
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must necessarily present evidence that had not factored into the sentence imposed.  It 
is upon this very point that the Wade decision itself turned:  the information at issue in 
that case was “information which was in the possession of Wade and his counsel and 
presumably weighed by them in considering the sentence to which Wade agreed.”  
Wade, 125 Idaho at 526 (emphasis added).   
However, those same concerns do not exist in the traditional Rule 35 scenario.  
Rather, it is the information presented to the district court that factors into the sentence 
the district court is crafting.  Thus, the focus is properly on the information of which the 
district court was aware in that scenario.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals has 
expressly rejected the State’s argument in the traditional Rule 35 scenario:  “we 
respectfully disagree with Judge Swanstrom’s dissenting opinion . . . , in which he 
argues that a Rule 35 motion must rest upon information which was not, and could not 
have been presented at sentencing.  Our cases do not support such a cramped view 
of Rule 35, and we decline to adopt it today.”  State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577, 582 
(Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds as stated in State v. Larson, 158 Idaho 130, 
135-36 (Ct. App. 2014).  As the Court of Appeals has made plain, “It would ill serve the 
purpose of a Rule 35 motion to preclude the defendant from presenting fresh 
information about himself or his circumstances.”  Torres, 107 Idaho at 898. 
The Idaho Supreme Court uses this same standard.  In State v. Wersland, for 
example, the Supreme Court held that information regarding the defendant’s mental 
health treatment two years prior to the sentencing hearing was “new” information which 
justified a sentence reduction under Rule 35.  State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 504-05 
(1994).  Similarly, in State v. Arthur, the Supreme Court held that information regarding 
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the defendant’s ongoing treatment for a terminal illness was “additional” information 
which justified a sentence reduction under Rule 35.  State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 223 
(2008).  In both cases, the information which justified the sentence reduction was 
obviously information the defendant could have been aware of and presented at the 
initial sentencing hearing.  Nevertheless, it fulfilled the requirement reaffirmed in 
Huffman1:  “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to 
the district court in support of the rule 35 motion.”  Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203 
(emphasis added).     
As such, the proper standard in the traditional Rule 35 scenario is:  if the district 
court did not have the information at sentencing, it is new or additional information and 
is sufficient to support a Rule 35 motion.  Only in the extraordinary circumstance where 
the defendant is challenging a stipulated sentence does that focus change. 
Mr. Smith did not bargain for a stipulated sentence.  (See Tr., p.6, Ls.3-11 (noting 
the plea agreement only called for a particular sentence recommendation from the State 
on one of the charges; the agreement allowed for “open arguments” on the second) 
(emphasis added); accord. Entry of Plea Tr., p.7, L.24 - p.9, L.4 (the parties articulating 
the terms of the plea agreement); see also Tr., p.14, Ls.7-24 (defense counsel arguing 
for a sentence more lenient than the one the prosecutor recommended).)  Therefore, 
this is a traditional Rule 35 scenario, and so, the Wade standard is inapplicable.  The 
proper analysis focuses on whether the information Mr. Smith attached to his Rule 35 
motion had previously been presented to the district court.  Since, as discussed supra, it 
                                            
1 Arthur had actually been suspended pending the decision in Huffman, and so, 
expressly applied the standard as rearticulated by Huffman.  Arthur, 145 Idaho at 223. 
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was not (and since the State’s argument appears to concede that point), the information 
accompanying Mr. Smith’s motion is “new or additional” information.  As a result, his 
Rule 35 motion was not frivolous.  Therefore, as discussed in depth in the Appellant’s 
Brief, pages 5-11, the district court erred by denying Mr. Smith’s request for counsel on 
his Rule 35 motion. 
Furthermore, the State does not respond to Mr. Smith’s point, that one of the 
reasons counsel should be appointed pursuant to I.C. § 19-852 in such cases is to help 
a defendant marshal and present all the relevant information, as a defendant acting pro 
se may not be aware of, or able to obtain, all the relevant information.  (See App. 
Br., pp.9-11; see generally Resp. Br.)  Therefore, if the only question is whether the 
information the defendant has is sufficient to meet the threshold standard for Rule 35 
motions, counsel should still have been appointed.  If the State’s argument to the 
contrary is endorsed, it allows the district court to deny a request for counsel because it 
has already decided to deny the motion on its merits.  Such a position is, as the Idaho 
Supreme Court has explained, untenable.  (See App. Br., pp.9-11 (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s precedent on this point in depth).) 
Since Mr. Smith presented a non-frivolous Rule 35 claim supported by new or 
additional information which had not, to that point, been presented to the district court, 
the district court erred in denying his motion for appointment of counsel. 
 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 Motion 
The State’s responses concerning the district court’s ruling on the merits of 
Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 motion are not remarkable, and as such, no further reply is 
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necessary in regard to those issues.  Accordingly, Mr. Smith simply refers the Court 
back to pages 12-13 of his Appellant’s Brief. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order denying his Rule 
35 motion and that it remand this case to the district court for further proceedings 
following appointment of counsel.  Alternatively, he requests this Court reduce his 
sentence as it deems appropriate, or else, vacate the order denying his Rule 35 motion 
and remand the case for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 14th day of July, 2016. 
 
      _________/s/________________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
 9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of July, 2016, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
 
DANIEL JOSEPH SMITH 
INMATE #69623 
NCWC 
1640 11TH AVENUE NORTH 
NAMPA ID 83687 
  
SAMUEL A HOAGLAND 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 







      __________/s/_______________ 
      EVAN A. SMITH 
      Administrative Assistant 
 
BRD/eas 
 
